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Abstract
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multibillion-dollar 
infrastructure investment project, is heralded as a game changer for Pakistan’s 
economy. It is part of the major development initiative led by China, known as 
‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), connecting Asia with Europe, the Middle East 
and Africa, and for those involved it evokes hopes, a myriad of interests, and it 
spurs a geopolitical shift (Ze 2015; 2014, October 2014). However, such a 
megaproject also raises numerous questions, especially with regards to the 
feasibility of its implementation in view of tremendous security challenges. In 
order to guarantee a secure environment for the CPEC development, the military 
is expanding its power. This phenomenon significantly affects the country’s civil-
military relations and civilian control over the military, while challenging the 
process of democratic transition. To assess the correlation between CPEC 
development and quality of democracy, the paper applies the ‘Heidelberg Model 
of Civilian Control’ (Croissant et al. 2013, 2011 April, 2011, 2010, 2009); it 
analyses the influence of the military on the decision-making and implementation 
process vis-à-vis the civilian government, understood as the elected 
representatives of the people. It will be argued that: First, the way in which 
CPEC is being implemented limits the decision-making powers of the civilian 
government and hampers civilian control over the military. Second, since civilian 
control of the military is interpreted as a prerequisite for democracy, the CPEC 
development is undermining the process of democratic transition initiated by the 
2013 general elections. Third, to ensure the CPEC development, the military has 
built-up a parallel governance structure, exercising tremendous executive and 
judicial powers and side-lining the civilian government. 
1. This working paper got presented at the 24th European Conference on South Asian Studies 
(ECSAS), University of Warsaw (Poland) from 27 to 30 July 2016.
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1. Introduction 
Pakistan has spent several decades under military rule, as such it is often considered to be a 
classic example of a praetorian state (Kukreja 1991; Perlmutter 1977; Rizvi 2004; Shah 
2003). The military perceives itself as the sole guardian of national sovereignty and moral 
integrity, the chief initiator of the national agenda and the arbiter of conflict between social 
and political forces (Ahmed 2009; Cloughley 2008; Rizvi 2003; Waseem 2007). Furthermore, 
civilian rule has always been characterised by unrestricted and persistent power struggles 
between government and opposition, between different political institutions (branches of 
government) and tensions between the central government and the provinces. These struggles 
are fuelled by autocratic rule, mismanagement and corruption and generated a situation in 
which the civilian government lost public support and  allowed the army to further build its 
reputation and ‘moral legitimacy’ and its potential to intervene directly in politics (Wolf 2013, 
April 1). Subsequently, the military (deliberately or unconsciously) was able to foster the 
perception that the government was neither able to form a sustainable, functioning state 
apparatus, nor capable of effectively running the affairs of the state. With this in mind, and 
observing the development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and respective 
projects, one cannot help but feel that history is repeating itself. More concretely, much of the 
criticism on CPEC focuses on where the concrete routes of the corridor will be build and 
whether Chinese investments and economic zones (SEZs, industrial and manufacturing hubs) 
favour the Punjab region at the expense of the provinces of Baluchistan and KPK (Raza 2015, 
November 24). Given the level of secrecy surrounding the project, there is no doubt that some 
of this criticism is justified. However, these debates also fail to take into account one 
significant point: the increasing institutionalization of a formal role for the military in the 
country’s political system. !
 
In order to assess the correlation between CPEC development and quality of democracy, the 
paper applies the ‘Heidelberg Model of Civilian Control’.2 This model helps to analyse the 
influence of the military on the decision-making and implementation process vis-à-vis the 
civilian government, understood as the elected representatives of the people. As such, the 
paper is based on the hypothesis that civilian control of the armed forces is a sine qua non for 
democratic consolidation. Having said this, the article puts forth the following arguments: 
Firstly, the way in which the CPEC gets implemented does not only limit the decision-making 
power of the civilian government but also hampers civilian control of the armed forces. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See for ‘Heidelberg Model of Civilian Control’: Croissant et al. (2013, 2011 April, 2011, 2010, 2009). 
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Secondly, since civilian control of the armed forces is interpreted as a sine qua non for 
democratic consolidation, the operationalization of the CPEC is undermining the democratic 
transition process initiated by the 2013 general elections. It was the very first time in the 
history of Pakistan that a transfer of power from one civilian government to another took 
place through an election (Wolf 2013, July 5). Thirdly, to ensure the implementation of the 
CPEC, the military was able to set up a parallel governance structure, exercising tremendous 
executive and judicial powers.   
 
2. Analytical framework 
 
2.1 Concept of Embedded Democracy 
To discuss democracy, one must start with the premise that there is a widespread agreement 
on the notion of ‘people’s sovereignty’. However, there is endless theoretical debate about 
what might be the best and most suitable realization of that abstract concept. Subsequently, 
there are numerous definitions of democracy which are derived from different streams of 
political thinking, ideological convictions and worldviews. Despite this variety, mainstream 
definitions of democracy understand ‘modern democracy’ as a set of institutional 
arrangements (form of government), that guarantee that the polity is “governed by the freely 
expressed will of the people whereby all individuals are to be treated as equals” (Hadenius 
1992). Here, it is most important to point out, that the conception of democracy must derive 
from three democratic core principles or values, namely: the peoples’ sovereignty, equality, 
and liberty (Brettschneider 2006). The realization of these three principles is a sine qua non 
for democratic rule. There is much disagreement in the literature, not only on how to realize 
peoples’ sovereignty, but also on how equality and liberty should be implemented in practice. 
Having said this, one can identify a wide range of different concepts and definitions of 
democracy, from minimalist-procedural ‘electoral’ “version that equate democracy with the 
mechanisms to choose political elites to represent them (Dahl 1971), to more expansive 
concepts of liberal, participatory, strong, or deliberative democracy (Diamond 2008). The 
former one reduces democracy to the a functioning electoral system and a representative form 
of government (Dah 1971; Schumpeter 1942). This has raised criticism among many scholars 
working on the conceptualisation of ‘modern, liberal democracy’. The basic argument is that 
‘electoral minimalism’ is only focusing on one aspect of democracy and is not sufficiently 
addressing all three essential democratic core values. Therefore, in order to fill this gap, the 
philosophical notion of ‘liberal democracy’ is added to the minimum of an electoral system 
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through the recognition of universal fundamental civil rights, individual liberties, the rule of 
law, accountability and more specific requirements such as civilian supremacy in decision 
making and civilian control over the armed forces. !
 
In an attempt to translate the theoretical notion of ‘liberal democracy’ into a systematic and 
integrated framework the multidimensional concept of ‘embedded democracy’ was developed 
(Merkel 2004; Merkel et al., 2003; Merkel). At the core lies the assumption that in order to 
fulfil all three democratic principles in a given political system, a set of institutions must be 
established and can analytically be disaggregated into five ‘partial regimes’: (A) the electoral 
regime, (B) the system of political liberties and political participation, (C) the regime of civil 
rights, (D) the system of horizontal accountability, and (E) institutions that guarantee the 
effective power for the democratically elected representatives.!
 
!
Source: Merkel et al., 2003; Merkel, 2004 
 
Partial regime A institutionalizes the democratic principle of peoples’ sovereignty and 
responsive and accountable rule through universal, free, fair and meaningful elections. !
 
Partial regime B complements the electoral regime by providing for the necessary political 
rights of participation and articulation, both are necessary to make elections meaningful 
instruments of vertical accountability through the rights of free political association and 
unhindered information.!
 
Partial regime C limits political power, prevents the abuse of political authority and 
guarantees individual freedom through a set of civil liberties.!
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Partial regime D prevents the abuse of state power and ensures inter-agency supervision 
through institutional checks and balances between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches.!
 
Finally, partial regime E includes those institutions that guarantee only democratically elected 
politicians exercise decision-making powers in relevant political issues. They prevent extra-
constitutional actors from infringing upon the legitimate political authorities’ power to 
govern.!
 
When linked together, these partial regimes ensure the healthy functioning of a mature 
democracy. In this context, each of these partial regimes and their respective institutional 
arrangements provide the basis of the democratic system as a whole. In other words, each of 
the partial regimes provides a comprehensive set of norms, rules and practices that interact 
with the other. More concretely, the different regimes are mutually influencing and balancing 
the functions of the other partial regimes. Only if this “mutual embeddedness” is guaranteed, 
there can be a functioning and resilient democracy. If any of these parts is left out or limited 
(infringing upon the norms, rules, or practices like press freedom, violation of human rights, 
restrictions on freedom of association), this results in the erosion of the liberal character of 
democracy.  
 
Croissant et al. (2010: 953) argue that if any of the five partial regimes is undermined, ‘liberal 
democracy’ deteriorates into ‘defective democracy’ or – if the damage to the overall system is 
big enough – leads to democratic collapse3. They identify the problem of civilian control of 
the military in partial regime E (Effective Power to Govern). Against this backdrop, one must 
point out that in many states the military is threatening democratically elected representatives’ 
effective power to govern (Croissant et al. 2010: 953). !
 
The very features that enable militaries to fulfil their duties, i.e. protecting communities by 
projecting coercive force towards enemies, also provides them with the ability to enforce their 
will upon the very societies (and respective governments) that created them (Feaver 1999, 
1996, Croissant et al. 2010). Therefore, all societies and political regimes must ensure that the 
country’s armed forces are subordinate to legitimate (elected) political decision-makers. As 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See also Merkel et al. (2003); Merkel and Croissant (2000). 
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such, civilian control means that the civilian government carries final responsibility for 
political and military decision-making (Croissant et al. 2010). 
 
2.2 Concept of Civilian Control 
This paper refers to … as “a consensus in democratization literature that civilian control of the 
military is a sine-qua-none condition for democratic consolidation” (Croissant et al. 2010: 
950). “Only if democratically elected political leaders and their appointed officials control the 
armed forces can democratic rules and processes persist”4 (Croissant et al. 2010: 950). In line 
with this argument (without civilian control democracy is impossible) civil-military relations 
are understood as the distribution of decision-making power between civilians (defined as 
democratically elected representatives of the people as supreme power) and the armed forces 
(Croissant et al. 2010: 950). !
In this scheme, civilian control marks one pole along the decision-making power 
continuum, the situation in which ‘civilians make all the rules and can change them at any 
time’5. Croissant et al. (2011 April, 2011, 2010) define civilian control as that the continuous 
distribution of decision-making power in which civilians have the sole authority to decide 
matters of politics as well as their implementation. Under civilian control, they can freely 
choose to delegate decision-making power and the implementation of certain policies to the 
military while the military has no autonomous decision-making power outside the areas 
specifically defined by civilians. In this context, only civilians determine which respective 
policies, or certain policy dimensions, the military implements, and they alone define the 
boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation. In addition, civilian 
authorities control sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they can—in principle—
revise their delegations at any time6 (Croissant et Al. 2011, 2010: 955).!
On the other pole of the continuum is the military regime, in which the military controls 
all decisions concerning political structures, processes, and policies and the civilians do not 
possess any autonomous political decision-making power. In this sense, civilian control is a 
relative condition, i.e., it is possible to distinguish different degrees of civilian control (e.g., 
strong or weak, encompassing or limited).  
Challenges to civilian decision-making power can take two analytically distinct shapes: 
formally institutionalized prerogatives and informal contestation. Institutionalized 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See also Dahl (1989). 
5 See also Kohn (1997, 142). 
6 See also Kemp und Hudlin (1992); Pion-Berlin (1992); Kohn (1997); Bland (2001); Feaver (1999; 1996); 
Welch (1976). 
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prerogatives describe formal rights by which the military is able ‘to exercise effective control 
over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state-
apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or social society’7” 
(Croissant et al. 2011: 140, 2010: 956). The dominance of civilian or military leadership in 
decision-making authority depends on five elements: elite recruitment, public policy, internal 
security, national defence, and military organization.  
 
The area of Elite Recruitment refers to the core defining aspects of the political regime, 
namely the rules, criteria and processes of recruiting, selecting and legitimizing those in 
political office. Any actor who controls this area is thus able to define “who rules and who 
decides who rules”8. Civilian control over elite recruitment means that the military is 
proscribed from establishing an alternative channel for access to political office, and, 
simultaneously, the processes of elite selection in terms of the formation, working, and 
transfer of political leadership are not subject to the explicit consent or implicit acquiescence 
of the military (Chambers 2010). “Civilian control over rules of competition is undermined 
when public offices are excluded from open competition and if the military influences 
electoral procedures. Civilian control over the rules of participation is constrained if active 
military personnel are eligible for public office and soldiers influence the formation and 
dissolution of government” (Croissant et al. 2011: 139-140, 2010: 957). 
 
Meanwhile, the area of Public Policy focuses upon all policy fields except the narrowly 
understood aspects of security and defence policy. This includes (1) all phases of the political 
decision-making process, including the identification of political problems to be addressed 
and their transfer into the political system (agenda-setting); the definition of policy goals and 
the elaboration of alternative policies to address these problems (policy formulation), and the 
selection of a concrete policy out of these alternatives (policy adoption’); (2) the 
implementation of these decisions by the administration. “Civilian control over this area 
means that civilians alone decide on the contents, scope, and duration of policy decisions and 
possess effective means to control and supervise the administrative implementation of these 
decisions” (Croissant et al. 2010: 957). However, “while all policy issues are important to 
gauge the degree of civilian control over this area, it is particularly relevant if the military has 
any influence, formal or informal, on the national budget” (Croissant 2011: 140). !
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See also Stepan (1988: 93). 
8 See also Taylor (2003: 7).  
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Internal security constitutes a third area of civil-military relations and can be defined in terms 
of two elements. First, it has a geographic element as it focuses on the threats originating 
within the realm of the states’ own territory; the second element stems from the role and the 
duties of various state agencies (Chambers 2010). It involves the use of armed forces in a 
purely domestic environment, which includes public order in emergency situations (including 
disaster relief), preparation for counterinsurgency warfare and terrorism, domestic intelligence 
gathering, daily policing and border controlling.9 “These activities are compatible with 
civilian control only if civilians have the right to make the decisions on the range, duration 
and frequency of all internal military operations as well as the civilian institutions, and are 
able to monitor their implementation” (Chambers 2010, Croissant et. al. 2013, 2011: 140, 
2010: 958). 
 
National Defence remains the core function of any military and includes all aspects of defence 
policy, ranging from the development of security doctrines to the deployment of troops 
abroad and conduct of war (Alagappa, 2001; Trinkunas, 2005). Soldiers, as experts in security 
matters, are often involved in the formulation and implementation of national defence 
policies, even in modern established democracies. However, as such policies, and especially 
their implementation, can determine the security of the nation, it is crucial that they remain 
under civilian jurisdiction and oversight. As such, national defence activities can only be 
compatible with civilian supremacy when civilians control the range, duration and frequency 
of these missions and related activities. Additionally, the civilian institutions must be able to 
effectively oversee the armed forces’ implementation of national defence and security policies 
and to monitor the military’s external security missions (Chamber 2010, Croissant et. al. 
2011: 140, 2010: 958-959).!
 
Finally, the area of Military Organization comprises decisions on all organizational aspects of 
the military as an institution, which can be organized into two dimensions10. The first 
dimension refers to the material aspects (‘hardware’) of military organization: force, size and 
structure, procurement and production of military equipment, as well as other institutional, 
financial and technological resources of the military. The second dimension (‘software’), 
includes the ideational aspects of military organization (e.g. doctrine and education); and 
decisions on personnel selection such as recruitment, appointment and retirement (Chambers 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See also Collier (1999); Trinkunas (2005). 
10 See also Alagappa (2001); Bland (1999; 2001); Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster (2002a, 2002b); Lambert (2009, 
279-296); Pion-Berlin (1992); Stepan (1988). 
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2010, Croissant et. al. 2011: 140; 2010: 958-959). One may be able to measure the level of 
civilian control in this area by the extent to which civilians are able to decide on the 
‘hardware’ and ‘software’ of armed forces’ organisation and the extent to which civilians can 
set the boundaries of military autonomy in deciding on these armed forces-internal affairs” 
(Croissant et al. 2011: 140, 2010: 959-960). !
 
3. A Pretorian State: The role of the military in Pakistan politics!
Pakistan has been ruled by its military forces for 36 years between 1947 and 2008, more than 
half of its existence; unsurprisingly, most analysts agree that Pakistan's political system is 
largely dysfunctional. Since its independence in 1947, the country oscillated various types of 
military rulers, political authoritarianism and some democratic intermezzos. Despite the rise 
of electoral politics under Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990. 1993-1996) and 
Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993, 1994, 1997-1999, 2013-present), this did not result in a 
comprehensive and sustainable democratic system (Croissant et al. 2013: 175). The main 
reason for this is that the “colonial notion of civilian supremacy over the military and the 
military’s aloofness from politics” (Rizvi 2009; 2007) soon dispersed after the new state of 
Pakistan came into existence. Since the end of British colonial rule in 1971, Pakistan has seen 
the emergence of a strong military allied with the country’s bureaucracy. As a result of 
numerous perceived internal and external threats and challenges11, the bureaucracy has been 
side-lined over time in a power-sharing model and decision-making process dominated by the 
military. Under the popularly elected Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977), civilian power was 
somewhat restored, but this was just another form of power-sharing between civilians (this 
time elected ones) and the armed forces (Rais 1988). As the army grew in strength and size, 
the development of the political system became characterized by a lack of institutionalization 
and chronic instability (Nawaz 2008: xxviii). This trend contributed to an imbalance of power 
and favoured the armed forces. Simultaneously, this weakened civilian power in the political 
decision-making process. The succeeding regime of General Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988)12 
seemed to embody the ultimate and institutionalized dominance13 of the military in politics 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 For example, territorial dispute over Kashmir with India and a contested border with Afghanistan claiming 
parts of Pakistan’s territory, socio-economic problems, an under-institutionalized political society (There was no 
constitution until 1956 and general elections did not occur until 1970), over-bureaucratization of state and 
politics and unstable civilian governments. 
12 General Zia usurped power through a military coup on July 5, 1977 by unconstitutionally overthrowing the 
civilian government of Bhutto. 
13 There has been a tendency for the military to institutionalize its political role (especially under Zia ul-Haq and 
Pervez Musharraf) featured by three criteria: (1) the abandonment of former personalized forms of exercising 
political influence (Ayub Khan 1958-1962 and partly Yahya Khan 1962-1971); (2) the (informal) induction of 
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(Burki and Baxter 1991). This is evident from the unconventional transition to civilian rule 
between 1988 and 1999, which led to a situation in which civilian officials only barely 
seemed to survive in office amidst immense military power (Shafqat 1997). While at the end 
of this period, it seemed that civilian officials under Nawaz Sharif (1997 – 1999) were able to 
change the rules of the game; ultimately the military carried out a putsch and remained in 
power from 1999 until 2008 under the dictatorship of General (later president) Pervez 
Musharraf. After the successful 2013 general elections that marked the first transfer of power 
between two elected civilian governments, Pakistan appeared to be witnessing the rise of 
civilian rule. But despite this successful transition to elected government under a civilian 
president (traditionally the military used the position of president to exercise formal influence 
over the government, civilian proxy), the country’s political process remains under military 
tutelage and civilians have failed to fundamentally change civil-military relations (Croissant 
2013: 176). Subsequently, up until today the military top brass maintain crucial influence in 
all political decision-making areas, especially those related to the country`s internal and 
external security. In this context, terrorism, foreign policy regarding India and Afghanistan, 
the Kashmir issue, nuclear policy, and issues that relate to their corporate interests like 
defence budget, procurements, and business activities (Siddiqa 2009; 2003) are primarily 
controlled by the military. !
 
In sum, the civilian government has failed to deal with most major economic development 
and security challenges. In consequence, the military perceives itself as the sole saviour of the 
nation against threats to Pakistan’s integrity, sovereignty and statehood. Throughout the years, 
the military became so deeply entrenched in all levels of the Pakistani state, that they do not 
depend on any formal prerogatives to exercise influence over the political decision-making 
process or to secure their interests. Until this day, Pakistan has not experienced “civilian 
supremacy”, meaning that elected civilians exercised control over the countries security 
forces14 (Wolf 2013, April 1). This observation is important, as this paper argues this type of 
control is a sine qua non for democracy (Croissant et al. 2010). The lack of civilian control 
does not only limit the powers of elected administrations, but also creates anomalies in the 
electoral regime, political liberties, political participation and horizontal accountability. 
Therefore, Pakistan must be classified as a ‘defective democracy’ - which is only partly free 
(Freedom House, 2016) – taking into account the excessive powers of military and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
broader sections of the armed forces into the political system to run the affairs of state; and (3) the constitutional 
entrenchment of a political role for the armed forces, e.g. the introduction of the 8th Amendment. 
14 Understood as regular and paramilitary forces as well as intelligence agencies. 
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intelligence services and influence over the civilian government. This in fact allows them to 
manoeuvre, develop and implement its own strategies and gain control over the CPEC project. 
 
4. The CPEC in the context of civil-military relations and civilian control 
Praised as Pakistan’s new economic lifeline, CPEC is supposed to provide the essential link 
between the ‘land based belt’ and the ‘sea road’ and connect Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region with Gwadar Port on the Baluchistan coast in Pakistan’s 
southwest (Aamir 2015, February 7; Wolf 2013, March 24). According to the plans, the 
CPEC will be implemented through a ‘1+4’ cooperation structure (Rizvi 2015) with the 
Economic Corridor at the centre and Gwadar Port, energy, infrastructure and industrial 
collaboration as the four key areas. In order to support this endeavour, the corridor combines 
cross-sectional components of infrastructure, trade, connectivity, transport, energy and 
services, among others. It is expected that the CPEC will boost the country’s economic 
growth (Wolf 2016, March 16), attract much needed foreign investments, and improve the 
socioeconomic conditions in the poorer provinces. In brief, CPEC is portrayed as a unique 
opportunity to change the country’s economic outlook and improve Pakistan’s political and 
geostrategic standing in the region. However, besides several political, administrative, and 
environmental hurdles, the biggest challenge for Pakistan is to guarantee a secure and stable 
environment to develop the corridor. Due to the disappointing record of the federal 
government in Islamabad fighting terrorism and militancy, the military increasingly took over 
respective decision-making and implementation processes, weakening the power of the 
civilian government (Rizvi 2015, September 6). !
 
In this article, in the context of CPEC development, it is argued here that Pakistan is 
witnessing a total absence of civilian control. For the purpose of the article, civilian control is 
defined as “civilians having exclusive authority to decide on national politics and their 
implementation. Under civilian control, civilians can freely choose to delegate decision-
making power and the implementation of certain policies to the military while the military has 
no autonomous decision-making power outside those areas specifically defined by civilians” 
(Croissant et al. 2013, 2011 April, 2011, 2010, 2009). As such, full-ﬂedged civilian control 
requires that civilian authorities enjoy uncontested decision-making power in all significant 
policy areas, namely Elite Recruitment, Public Policy, Internal Security, External Defence, 
and Military Organisation. If the military gain dominance in any of these areas, civilian 
decision making powers are challenged. Based on this concept of civilian control, one can 
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easily identify that civilian decision-making power and democratic governance are weakened 
on the central and provincial level. 
 
4.1 Elite Recruitment!
Basically, one can observe that Pakistan has a long and unfortunate record of military 
influence in the area of elite recruitment; analyzing the military’s influence on the electoral 
process, there are various “electoral projects” on the national and regional levels. The 
military’s role in the parliamentary sphere gained momentum as political parties and their 
representatives (inside- as well as outside the parliamentary sphere) failed to develop a 
constructive relationship between government and opposition (Wolf and Kane 2010: 174-
176). Furthermore, key political players are often driven by personal rivalries and bitter 
conflicts. With the help of the intelligence services, politicians manipulated the 2008 elections 
to ensure a continued role for the armed forces (Wolf 2013, April 1: 26). With the help of the 
state machinery, the military successfully played political parties and leaders off against each 
other (Croissant et al. 2013: 291). In order to prevail in the polls, political parties were 
hampered by the influence of the military as they manipulated party rifts, created new parties, 
pressured individual candidates to withdraw in elections, restricted electoral campaigns or 
openly supported certain political parties (Wolf 2013, April 1: 26). Even elected governments 
found their authority undermined in a number of  ways, e.g. through facilitating votes of 
confidence by vote buying (horse trading) and were consequently ousted. All these 
complications inhibited the development of a functioning party system. The policy of creating 
tension (‘divide and rule’) between the different political leaders and their respective parties 
did not only lead to increased factionalism, it also paralysed the parliamentary process and 
frustrated the progression of a constructive relationship between opposition and government 
(Wolf 2013, April 1: 26).!
 
Finally, the 2008 and 2013 general elections appeared to be a critical juncture in the election 
process, as the military did not try to influence the electoral process and limited itself to its 
role as defined by the civilian government. As such, the military appeared to have given up – 
at least temporarily – control over government formation (Croissant et. al. 2013: 191). At the 
moment, there are no indicators that the military’s activities regarding CPEC impact the 
elections; however, considering the history of civil-military relations it will be important to 
monitor the upcoming elections, especially the electoral campaigns and those who are critical 
of CPEC in general and the military’s role in particular.   
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4.2 Public Policy 
Public Policy, as far as it is not related to the corporate interests of the military, is the second 
area in which the of civilian government exercises some level of control (Wolf 2013, April 1; 
2010). There have been some negative developments since the CPEC launch. It is also crucial 
to mention that key areas of Pakistani public policy, especially foreign policy (e.g. India-
Pakistan relations, Kashmir conflict), are considered both inseparable from and subordinate to 
national defence policy by the top echelons of the armed forces (Wolf and Kane 2010: 180). 
Indeed, there is a similar logic within the military that links all policy fields: foreign and 
defence policies are a matter of survival and as such it seriously affects domestic policy 
(Pattanaik 2000). This view is also found in the civilian sphere: Pakistan’s security and 
territorial integrity is more important than economic development.  
Although such development and self-reliance contribute to strengthening the nation's defence 
capabilities, the defence requirements of this sovereignty have to be met first (Bhutto 2009: 
117). While the dominance of the military in this area is a product of both external and 
internal factors, the internal are the most significant ones.  Indeed, the civilian government 
supported the emerging decision-making role of the armed forces in all areas of public policy, 
especially in foreign, economic and financial (budgetary) policies. Here, the military was first 
a mentor and arbitrator and eventually the primary authority. It was able to manipulate and 
control not only the institutions of decision-making but also the political behavior of civilian 
actors. In addition, the armed forces were able to extend and consolidate their influence over 
the appointment of military officers (both active and retired) as they managed and controlled 
positions of civilian authorities and ministries (Rizvi 2003; Shafqat 1997: 35).!
In this context, the establishment of the military Apex Committees at federal and provincial 
levels, combined with a lack of parliamentarian oversight by the national and provincial 
assemblies, seriously hampers the decision-making power of the government. In other words, 
most of the important decisions related to CPEC are made by this military-bureaucratic 
hybrid, enhancing civil-military interaction to improve the security situation in general and to 
counter terrorism in particular (ISPR 2015, January 3). In this context, the initial purpose of 
the Apex Committees was to coordinate security and implement the National Action Plan 
(NAP)15, which was drafted jointly by the government, the parliament and the army (Jaffrelot 
2016, April 1). While the initial (and official) function of the Apex Committees relates to 
institutionalizing (and legitimizing) the “process of decision-making via consultation between 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Source: http://infopak.gov.pk/InnerPage.aspx?Page_ID=46. 
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democratically elected authorities and the military” (Croissant et al. 2013: 192), it is obvious 
that the supreme authority on most crucial issues lies with the army. !
 
Over time, the Apex Committees have become more influential than the federal and 
provincial cabinets or other specialist civil institutions. This is evident from the fact that 
federal and provincial cabinets meet less frequently compared to federal and provincial Apex 
Committees (Rizvi 2015, December 27). Furthermore, Apex commitees are not just dealing 
with security related issues, but function as core institutions dealing with the implementation 
of all kinds of CPEC related projects. Against this backdrop, one should keep in mind the 
dominant role the Pakistani Army has played in country politics, either directly (military coup 
and martial law) or indirectly (influencing the government decision makers to act in the 
interest of the military). What is essentially different about the Apex committees however, is 
that this setup formally merges the military with the civilian government, it enhances their 
role in administrative management and strengthens their position in all decision-making areas 
relating to CPEC and beyond (Rizvi, 2015, August 9). !
Moreover, this trend dates back to the enactment of 21st constitutional amendment that led to 
new institutional arrangements granting special powers to the armed forces and establishing 
military courts (Wolf 2015, May 14).16 While there is no officially confirmed correlation 
between the 21st constitutional amendment and the establishment of these military courts, 
both measures focus on improving the security situation; which in turn is a sine qua non for 
continued Chinese support of the CPEC project. !
However, the 21st amendment entails a significant power transfer to the military, especially 
the fact that civilians can be subjected to military jurisdiction is a major cause of concern. 
Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether the proposed ‘special tribunals’ will function under 
the supervision of the country’s highest court or if there will be any effective parliamentary 
oversight. In this regard, one should mention that it is a generally accepted international prin-
ciple that military courts should have no jurisdiction over civilians (Decaux 2010). In other 
words, the judicial system must ensure that civilians accused of a criminal offence of any na-
ture, including terrorism, are brought to justice by civilian courts. Military courts in many 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 The 21st amendment to the Constitution also provides for entering the Pakistan Army Act 1952, the Pakistan 
Army Act 1953, the Pakistan Navy Act 1961 and the Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014 in the first schedule of the 
Constitution. The first schedule of the Constitution contains laws which are exempted from the application of 
Article 8 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. These articles are part of Chapter 1 of the Constitution relating to the 
fundamental rights (Pakistan Today, 6.1.2015). More concrete, the 21st Amendment Act provides for the 
creation of military speed trial courts (STCs) for offences relating to terrorism, waging war against Pakistan and 
prevention of acts threatening the security of the country. The Act shall remain in force for two years starting 
January 7, 2015 after the President signed the Act (Pakistan Today, 6.1.2015). 
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countries have a bad reputation and a poor record offering a fair trial, especially regarding 
procedural and fundamental rights of the defendant (Decaux 2010). 
 
Taking the underlying causes of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism into account, it is 
highly doubtful that Pakistan’s public safety will improve with or be guaranteed by the setup 
of military courts. This move is yet another sign of the dysfunctional nature of the political 
system and the incompetence or unwillingness of the ‘establishment’ to deal with the tremen-
dous challenges the country faces. In contrast, it is obvious to many international counter-
terrorism experts that Pakistan’s security forces have continuously nurtured terrorist groups in 
the country, particularly in the loosely-controlled tribal areas in the northwest bordering Af-
ghanistan. Subsequently, the civilian government was unable to reach an agreement on how to 
deal with these militants (Jaffrey 2015, January 6), nor did they have the sufficient decision-
making power and competence to implement a comprehensible counter-terrorism strategy. As 
such, it would be inaccurate to say they were coerced into accepting special military courts; 
there is also a high level of unwillingness among the civilian leadership and political class to 
tackle militancy and fundamentalism and take any responsibility. Hence, the military is, once 
again, in charge and the civilians remain side-lined by their own inadequacy. This dynamic is 
yet another example of shifting responsibilities at the cost of democratic institutions. Howev-
er, there is still time for the civilian government to carry out necessary substantial reforms to 
improve the judicial criminal system. Ultimately, it is also noteworthy that the 21st Amend-
ment, despite appearances, is not just a short-sighted knee-jerk response (Jaffrey 2015, Janu-
ary 6) or ‘extraordinary measure for an extraordinary situation’ (Dawn, 2015 January 6). 
Quite the contrary, it is a well-planned, gradual strategy, intended to build up a formal role of 
the military in the country’s political landscape. Some analysts would call it a ‘constitutional 
coup’ or as describe it as “a monument to the betrayal of the civilian, democratic cause” 
(Dawn, 2015, January 3). Military justice without transparency and oversight is undermining 
the democratic process in Pakistan, which lacks the experience, willingness and tradition to 
consolidate political institutions under civilian control. Therefore, the 21st Amendment is not 
only indicative of the willingness of the military leadership to openly direct the political pro-
cess, but also indicates that the country is once again under the auspices of military rule. Here, 
one must consider that the latest constitutional manoeuvring bolsters the existing informal 
dominance of the armed forces as it strengthens its  formal institutional role. Handing over 
more power to an institution that has a history of undermining and arbitrarily changing the 
Constitution is more than just an act of negligence. The 21st Amendment may well be the 
! 
 
!
16!
surrender of any previous democratic achievements and further widens the path of deeply 
entrenched authoritarian tendencies. Also, recent history shows that Pakistan’s security circles 
have an idiosyncratic definition of terrorism that is not necessarily in line with the understand-
ing of this phenomenon in the international community. Subsequently, observers fear that 
these military trials will not be confined to terrorism charges but will also be used against 
political opposition, the media and separatist groups, especially those in the Balochistan prov-
ince (Jaffrey 2015, January 6). 
 
While the civilian government has some level of decision-making power in Pakistan’s foreign 
policy as long as their actions coincide with the military’s goals. Generally speaking though, 
all important foreign policy decisions are made by the military, especially those regarding 
Kashmir, India and Afghanistan. Up until this day, each attempt by the civilian government to 
reach a rapprochement deal with India has been boycotted and undermined by the military 
(Rizvi 2003: 211-212). Furthermore, the military also exercises an important influence 
regarding Pakistan-Iran relations, de facto undermining Prime Minister Sharif’s foreign policy 
with its neighbours. For example, while Mr. Sharif promised the government in Riyadh that 
Pakistan would provide soldiers for the war in Yemen, Chief-of-Army-Staff (COAS) General 
Sharif soon “checked him – refusing to provide the troops because of the repercussions on 
domestic sectarian harmony” (Alam 2015, December 4). Moreover, the military’s 
unwillingness and/or inability to eradicate cross-border terrorism, as it allows militant groups 
to use its territories for recruitment, training, and equipment, is a severe stumbling block in 
Pakistan relations with Afghanistan, obstructing constructive cooperation. 
 
The military’s behaviour and support for cross-border also negatively affects CPEC and Paki-
stan’s ability to maximise the use of the corridor. CPEC has the potential to function as a crit-
ical juncture in Pakistan’s struggle to achieve economic growth and could be a ‘game chang-
er’ in regional cooperation and integration. Whether CPEC may positively affect regionaliza-
tion depends on its ability to increase regional connectivity as much as possible. Therefore, it 
is most important that the CPEC is to be integrated in the wider transport, energy and trade 
infrastructure networks beyond the Pakistan-China nexus (Wolf 2016, June 28). As CPEC is 
linked with Kashgar Special Economic Zone_, a successful entrenchment into the northern 
networks is ensured, connecting the CPEC to Central Asian States, Russia and Europe. How-
ever, it is most important that Pakistan includes its neighbors as they would greatly benefit if 
the project succeeds. In particular, Pakistan should open up the CPEC to the West (Iran and 
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Afghanistan) and to the East (India) to make a significant impact on regional connectivity and 
only then can CPEC become a ‘game changer’ for regional cooperation in South Asia.  
  
For any real change to occur, a normalization of Pakistan-India relations and a constructive 
Pakistan-Iran relationship are essential preconditions. In the wake of the new US-Iran nuclear 
deal and subsequent removal of sanctions, Iran’s newly re-established international position in 
may open up new opportunities for closer cooperation with Pakistan. A successful eastward 
orientation would not only deepen regional cooperation but offers tremendous opportunities 
for the CPEC in general and the Western alignment of the economic corridor in particular. A 
rapprochement between Islamabad and Tehran would likely increase energy cooperation and 
trade (Wolf 2016, June 28). 
 
While relations with Iran are important, the most poignant issue is the normalisation of 
Pakistan-India relations, instead of focussing on ideological and security oriented parameters; 
there must be a greater emphasis on trade and economic cooperation. Therefore, a 
fundamental change in the mindset of Pakistan’s military is a prerequisite and must include a 
substantial reassessment of foreign relations, reduction of threat perceptions, and most 
importantly the transfer of decision-making power to the civilian government. At the moment 
it seems that opposite trend is taking place as the army’s involvement in the CPEC project 
further entrenches the military’s central role in foreign affairs. Not only did this lead to an 
increase of diplomatic activities beyond military-to-military contacts, but it also the army’s 
direct involvement in entities like the ‘International Forum on the China Pakistan Economic 
Corridor’. Despite the fact that the International Forum is hailed as the first platform on which 
top civil and military organisations meet to promote the common objective of building the 
CPEC, the composition of the Pakistani delegation during its first meeting clearly emphasises 
the strong influence of the military in this bilateral entity (The Nation 2015, August 17). In 
sum, the engagement of the military in all aspects of the CPEC project shows they are 
solidifying their influence on public policy but also expand their decision-making power. In 
contrast –other than superficial influence on foreign policy and some areas of economic 
interest– the civilian government has little room to manoeuvre.  
 
4.3 Internal Security 
Since its independence, Pakistan has been in a state of a political instability and the military 
has been highly involved in state building activities (e.g. infrastructure development, water 
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and energy schemes) and internal security operations. Initially, the military tried not to be 
drawn into the “handling of law and order situations”;17 however, every Pakistani government 
continuously requested this involvement from the military, a phenomenon which has been 
authorised in Pakistan’s various constitutions. While this influence was one of the main 
sources of the military’s self-confidence and legitimacy to intervene in Pakistani politics 
(Wolf and Kane 2010:187-188); it then dictated its own function to include management of 
external security challenges as well as internal security threats. Over the years it started to 
promote the image of “ultimate guarantor of the country’s internal stability and territorial 
integrity” (Talbot 2002: 322). Indeed, the military perceived itself as the most sophisticated 
and functional instrument to tackle the many socio-economic and political challenges of the 
country. This also explains the military’s air of superiority in state-building vis-à-vis elected 
politicians (Wolf 2013, April 1; Wolf 2012; Wolf and Kane 2010). This attitude is evident in 
their approach regarding the CPEC project, the military seems to think that neither its 
implementation nor any decision-making should rest completely in civilian hands (Pattanaik 
2000). !
 
One can state that the security challenge arising from CPEC development have had the most 
significant impact on civil-military relations and diminished civilian control in decades. The 
increasing autonomy of the army in the area of internal security -especially since the country 
officially joined the US-led “Global War against Terror”- shows in the army’s ability to 
define, formulate and implement its own policy agenda without depending on the civilian 
decision-making process. For example, they have full control over the size, scope and 
duration of domestic missions, as seen during the unilateral decision to launch the Zarb-e-Azb 
Operation18 in the summer of 2014 (Zahid, 2015, July 10). The decisions to extend the 
campaign (Haider 2015, July 3) and the geographical scope of this anti-terrorist campaign has 
also been decided by the armed forces themselves. Zarb-e-Azb (Wolf, June 2015) initially 
focused on the border areas of Afghanistan, but soon the army declared the whole territory of 
Pakistan would be included in the area of operation. In this context, the main (official) goal of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 This is understood as aid-to-civilian-power missions, the objective of which has been to restore civilian 
authority in law and order crises or to cope with natural calamities (e.g. in East Pakistan there occurred the 
Bengali-Urdu language crisis; various food crises; and the Dhaka police riots; while West Pakistan was 
confronted with the Karachi riots and the Ahmedia crisis, all of which transpired in the 1950s). (Cheema 2002: 
122). 
18 Operation Rast-e-Rath (27 April-30 June 2009) is another interesting example for Pakistan’s autonomy in 
internal security decision making. Operation Rast-e-Rath or Rah-e-Nijat refers to a full-fledged military action in 
the Swat district of the Malakand Division of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan, aiming to crush 
the followers of the militant organization Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) as well as Taliban 
elements, operating in this area. Subsequently to counter similar extremist elements in the South Waziristan 
Agency, Operation Rah-e-Nijat was carried out. See for more details: Noor 2009.  
! 
 
!
19!
the  security apparatus is to link CPEC with the aim of achieving a ‘terror free Pakistan’.19 In 
the words of Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif: "We [Pakistan’s 
security forces] will not stop unless we achieve our end objective of a terror-free Pakistan" 
irrespective of the costs (Haider 2015, July 3). These costs took the form of many human and 
material losses but also increased the willingness of the soldiers to side-line civilians and to 
scrutinize the latest achievements in democratic transitions for the sake of CPEC’s 
implementation. Another example of autonomous decision-making by the army are the 
Karachi security operations in which the military guided actions against terrorists and worked 
to root out violent groups, including extortionists, criminal mafias and armed wings of 
political and religious parties20 (Rizvi 2015, August 7). The circumstances were very similar 
to Zarb-e-Azb: the decision to carry out decisive measures against terrorists was made by the 
military and the rangers -a paramilitary force headed by the army- themselves (Rizvi 2015, 
August 7) and only informed the government after the decisions were made. !
 
Last but not least, due to mismanagement of the project (lack of political will, capacities, 
transparency and communication) and the half-hearted attempts of Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif’s administration to deal with jihadi terrorists and militants in the National Action Plan 
(NAP), created another opportunity for the army another opportunity to call on the ‘doctrine 
of necessity’ and take over. In other words, by portraying the civilian government as 
incompetent and unable to ensure security and stability –a crucial pre-requisite for the 
corridor- serves as a justification to act autonomously and to take over the implementation of 
the NAP and CPEC. In sum, up until now, the civilians continuously demonstrated their 
inability to deal with major economic development and security challenges. Instead it appears 
that politicians choose to identify the military as the sole saviour of the nation against threats 
to Pakistan’s internal security. Consequently, the civilian government lost control over the 
CPEC decision-making process on internal security. 
 
4.4 External Defence  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 The operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in North Waziristan (NWA) on June 15, 2014, following a major 
terrorist attacks (especially attacks on Karachi's international airport & Peshawar school attack) and the failure of 
peace negotiation between the government/army and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan/TTP. The campaign has been 
bolstered by a surge of 170,000 troops, almost a third of Pakistan’s entire military. Besides the TTP, the major 
targets were the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the East Turkestan 
Islamic Movement. (Sial, December 2014; Wolf, June 2015; Zahid, 10.7.2015). 
20 The security forces have arrested over 58,000 criminals. Of them, 9,570 were absconders while 630 were 
proclaimed offenders. Others apprehended during the operation included 1,731 murderers, 713 terrorists, 517 
extortionists and 118 kidnappers. Security forces also recovered 15,612 illegal weapons during the operation. 
Source: http://infopak.gov.pk/InnerPage.aspx?Page_ID=46 
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Since the country’s independence, especially after the first Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir, 
the military controlled defence and military policy and particularly Pakistan’s relations with 
India and Afghanistan (Wolf and Kane 2010: 185). Also, the country’s nuclear weapons 
programme is the sole responsibility of the armed forces, civilians are excluded from any 
meaningful influence in planning and implementing these policies21  (Bhimaya 1994; Waseem 
1994: 43; 2013, April 1). In other words, a political practice developed in which matters of 
national security (external defence) became the sole responsibility of the higher defence 
administration and the military echelons. Even after the latest transition to more civilian rule 
in 2008, elected leaders remained effectively side-lined in External Defence decision-making.  
Against this backdrop, there are indications that the CPEC project is further entrenching the 
dominant role of the army beyond matters of national security. The increase of the country’s 
security cooperation with China alongside the common economic corridor project serves as an 
example since it appears to be organised by the military, at least on the Pakistani side.  
To deepen the security-military cooperation, Islamabad and Beijing agreed to intensify 
collaboration in defence, counter-terrorism, and space and maritime technology (Daily Times 
2015, April 21; Syed 2015, April 21). To give life to this additional military arrangement, 
alongside the pledged funds for CPEC, China promised to deliver eight submarines, worth 
between $4 billion and $5 billion (Detsch 2015, April 21; Shams 2015, April 20). This is 
likely to heighten Indian and US concerns that Gwadar will not only be used for economic 
purposes but will also serve as a major naval base for Chinese and Pakistani Navy. The fact 
that China helped to build Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities and that the new deal will 
also include cooperation in civil nuclear energy (Daily Times 2015, April 21)22 creates an 
even bigger fear in New Delhi. Furthermore, to enhance ideological and intellectual 
cooperation, a new joint Pakistan-China think tank will be launched, focused solely on 
research and development of the CPEC, called “Research and Development International 
(RANDI)” (Daily Times 2015, April 19). As such, RANDI should serve as a ‘Information 
Corridor’ to promote perspectives, data and information for policymakers, students, 
specialists, scholars and companies of both countries” (Daily Times 2015, April 19). It is 
assumed that this think tank will have a lot influence, far beyond CPEC matters, and is a step 
towards enhancing strategic communication and coordination to safeguard common Sino-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 For example, the decision to go for a further enrichment of the nuclear weapon program was clearly made by 
the military top echelon. In contrast, civilians were made responsible only to find a diplomatic solution for the 
consequences (international sanctions) (Kukreja 2003: 237). 
22 “Given how important nuclear weapons are to the South Asian nation's military capabilities and even identity, 
the significance attached to China's essential role in the nuclear program can hardly be overstated.” (Andrew 
Small quoted in Domínguez, 2015, January 15). 
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Pakistani interests (Daily Times 2015, April 21). The fact that Beijing offers to act as a 
mediator in Pakistan’s talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan indicates the direction RANDI 
research could take (Detsch 2015, April 21). In this context, one should mention that there is a 
departure from China’s official policy of non-interference in the domestic politics of other 
countries and it is most likely a shift away from its classic non-aligned foreign policy. 
Consequently, their extraordinary support for Pakistan, as old friend and ‘quasi-ally’, can be 
seen as a critical juncture in the way in which China’s handles bilateral relations. However, 
there are indicators that the Pakistani army uses security cooperation with China not only to 
play a role in security matters, but also to get a stake in administrative and management 
affairs of the CPEC project (Panda 2016, April 20; Rana 2016, April 16). In this context it is 
crucial to mention that the military submitted an informal proposal to the civilian government 
to set up a new institution: the CPEC Authority. This government body should function as a 
“consultative forum on the pattern of Apex Committees”23 to ensure a trouble-free 
implementation of the economic corridor with China (Ghumman 2016, February 10). 
Furthermore, COAS General Sharif had the vision to integrate CPEC as “part of the NAP 
against terrorism”. In other words, the army seeks to interpret a major development project as 
an instrument to eradicate terrorism under its own guidance (Daud 2016, June 8). However, 
until now Prime Minister Sharif and his administration rejected the idea to introduce this 
additional bureaucratic layer with strong military influence (February 10; Panda 2016, April 
20; Rana 2016, April 16). COAS Sharif did not accept this decision and proposed the matter 
to the Chinese Prime Minister during his visit in May 2016. During this stay, Pakistan’s top 
general emphasized the significance of military-to-military relations for China-Pakistan ties 
and actively worked to convince the Chinese leadership to see economic cooperation and 
security collaboration as two sides of the same coin, or, in COAS Sharif’s words, they should 
be pushed forward “like two wheels” (Daud 2016, June 8). If this trend continues, the military 
can be expected to be more adamant and assertive in its attempts to control of public policy in 
general and CPEC in particular (Kaura 2016, May 2). 
 
4.5 Military Organisation 
During the first years of independence, there was little military organization to speak of and 
the military faced serious administrative and organisational challenges (Khan 1967). These 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 The basic concept behind the proposal is to create a body exclusively for the CPEC which can be used by the 
major stakeholders (namely provincial governments and the security actors) to present their ideas regarding 
project planning and implementation to the executing authority, the federal government (Ghumman 2016, 
February 10). The new authority is proposed to be headed by a chairman, who is to be assisted by director 
generals, responsible for implementation of the CPEC projects (Rana 2016, April 16) 
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were not only caused by the partition process but also by the unstable civilian governments 
that lacked the capacity to manage Pakistan’s state affairs. The armed forces had to rebuild 
their organisational structures “from scratch” and were overwhelmed with constant “aid-to-
civilian-power” missions (Cohen 1984: 33; Cohen 1983). Furthermore, the military 
underwent an extensive process of “Nationalization and Re-organization” (Rizvi 1987: 30-
34). However, over time the military leadership amassed influence and took over organization 
up to a point  that the officers’ corps rejected any civilian influence in its internal affairs. They 
argued it is something that “is against the institutional norms of the armed forces and will 
translate into risks and threats for organisational coherency”, it not only upsets the command 
hierarchy but also politicizes and destabilises the military (Khakwani 2003: 11). To sum up, 
civilian decision-making in the area of military organisation is perceived by most soldiers as 
efforts to generate dissension within the ranks, especially among the corps commanders 
(Khakwani 2003). Generally speaking, the military reject any attempts by the civilian 
government to establish supremacy (Wolf and Kane 2010: 191); it is therefore no surprise that 
the Prime Minister and the government became completely sidelined in all its internal affairs 
(Nawaz, 2008, 481-482). For example, the fact that the civilian government never amended 
the defence budget and service conditions (Rizvi, 2003, 205) of military business projects 
(Siddiqa, 2009) is a strong indicator of total military dominance in that area (Wolf 2012, May 
2018; 2012). Actually, other than the symbolic appointments of top senior officers, civilians 
abandoned any attempt to interfere in the military’s affairs (Wolf 2013, April 1). That civilian 
decision-making power in the area of military organization remained minimal can be also 
seen in the CPEC development. Here one can state that the military made the autonomous 
decision to provide security forces (The Indian Express 2016, May 17) to protect Chinese 
workers and investments and to set up special forces in Baluchistan (Reuters 2016, February 
8) and Sindh (Tunio 2016, January 20), dedicated solely to the protection of the CPEC and 
correlating projects. In sum, one can state that CPEC further entrenched the pattern that 
pushed decision-making power out of the hands of the civilian government and into the 
military’s area of influence. !
 
5. Final thoughts!
Since Pakistan became an independent state, the country experienced several changes in the 
role of the military in politics (Croissant et. Al. 2013:191) as it continuously undermined any 
attempts of institutional civilian control and ultimately, the consolidation of democracy. 
Consequently, the entire process of democratization in the country is highly irregular 
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(Khakwani, 2003, 23); there is no clear-cut transition from an authoritarian system towards 
the beginning of an uninterrupted, linear process of stabilization and consolidation of 
democracy. Instead, the political development is characterised by transitions between 
democratic, military, or semi-military regime types. After the initial phase of bureaucracy-
military domination (1947-1972), the country witnessed three attempts towards 
democratization; however, all three attempts can be explained as a response to military rule, 
producing national elected leaders (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif) and 
political parties (e.g. Pakistan People Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), 
or the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) founded and leaded by Imran Khan) (cf. Shafqat, 1997, 
256). The paradox is that on one side, these ‘democratic transitions’ were caused and 
facilitated by political interventions of the armed forces, but on the other side, they were 
conditioned and truncated by the military. The main reason for this is that the civilians were 
unable to institutionalize control over the armed forces. Against this backdrop, the 
implementation of the CPEC project and the need to ensure its overall security, as well as the 
overarching goal of a ‘terror free’ Pakistan, means the military sees a tremendous rise in 
activities and influence. Their current engagement creates opportunities for the armed forces 
to continue and extent their informal influence in decision-making but also establishes the 
strongest institutional role of the army in the country’s history. As such, the military’s 
engagement with the CPEC framework affects at least four out of the five key areas of 
civilian control, with only ‘elite recruitment’ remaining largely unaffected).  
Despite the fact that the decision-making takes place within a framework of mutual 
consultation and institutional mechanism (such as the Apex Committees, International Forum 
on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor) -indicating some degree of power-sharing between 
military and civilians- the supreme authority for the policy formulation of internal security 
and national defence is the military. Furthermore, the armed forces remain fully autonomous 
with regards to military organisation. Public policy -as far as it is not related with the 
corporate interests of the military- is the second area (other than ‘elite recruitment’) that 
entails some kind of civilian control. However, due to the fact that the CPEC is both a 
corporate mega project but also a development initiative, the military has ample opportunity 
to intervene in the remaining ‘civilian dominated policy areas’. In other words, since the 
military looks to control as much of the CPEC project as possible, hereby extending its role, 
civilian decision-making power in public policy is in severe decline. Most recently, the Prime 
Minister’s involvement in the ‘Panama Papers’ (BBC 2016, April 21) scandal weakens his 
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position and that of the government, creating additional momentum for the military to 
increase its leverage within the area of public policy (Notezai 2016, May 11).  
 
Against this backdrop, the way in which the civilian government handles the CPEC project, 
especially in light of the accusations of endemic corruption in the Sharif administration, 
enhances the perception that they are incapable of governing effectively. This is further 
strengthening the military’s ‘doctrine of necessity’ to intervene in politics, not only regarding 
internal and external security matters but also regarding social and economic progress in 
general and the implementation of the CPEC in particular. So, in order to carry out the 
essential tasks related to the economic corridor project, the military resorts to their traditional 
‘help-yourself’ attitude. It then created ‘reserved domains’ in public policy such as its own 
business activities (MILBUS, see Siddiqa 2009) or a foreign policy independent and separate 
from the rest of the government. For example, it has a wholly autonomous relationship with 
the US government. Thanks to their autonomy, seen in large enterprises like the semi-military 
Frontier Works Organisation (FWO)24 or the increasing independent diplomacy with China, 
the military has some extraordinarily effective instruments at its disposal to engage in the 
CPEC project and in all other related decision-making areas. In sum, one must state that the 
CPEC is another lost opportunity to improve civilian governance and control.  
 
Despite the traditionally dominant role of the military in Pakistani politics, over time, and due 
to extraordinary circumstances – for example after Pakistan’s armed forces lost wars (and its 
reputation) against India in 1965 and 1971 or the unexpected death of military dictator Zia-ul-
Haq in 1988 – the government had and lost several opportunities to regain control over ‘their’ 
military and its decision-making (Wolf 2014, November 13). As such, a successful 
implementation of the CPEC could have been an exceptional moment to strengthen its 
position vis-à-vis the military. In contrast, the ‘hype surrounding the CPEC’ created an 
atmosphere in which the armed forces effectively took on their strongest formally 
institutionalized role in the country’s political system yet. The military was not only able to 
extend its institutionalized role in decision-making process at the expense of all three 
branches of governance (executive, legislative and judiciary), but essentially build a ‘quasi-
parallel structure of governance’. The fact that Prime Minister Sharif was able to block the 
military proposal of the establishment of a CPEC Authority (featured by a remarkable military 
signature/leverage) is at best a ‘pyrrhic victory’; the military will either enforce the 
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24 For more information, see http://www.fwo.com.pk/. 
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establishment of such an authority by seeking Chinese support for the proposal or will rely on 
informal ways of increasing their power within CPEC project. However, it is clear that both 
strategies will further side-line the government’s role in CPEC related decision-making. In 
consequence, it might continue to be used as a public façade, but it is obvious that the military 
leadership is in charge (Jaffrelot 2016, April 1). In other words, there is simply no need for a 
military coup to rule the country and the civilian government failed once again to improve the 
unhealthy civil-military relations, to establish any noteworthy elements of civilian control 
over the armed forces, and subsequently to consolidate democratic rule in Pakistan. 
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